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NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-3482 
_____________ 
  
HAROLD M. HOFFMAN, Individually and 
on behalf of those similarly situated 
       
v. 
  
NUTRACEUTICAL CORPORATION, 
 
Harold M. Hoffman, 
   Appellant  
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. No. 2:12-cv-05803) 
District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 27, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL, District Judge.
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(Filed: April 10, 2014) 
 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
                                              
1
 The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the Southern District 
of Texas, sitting by designation. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Harold M. Hoffman appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to 
remand his putative class action to state court.  Because the District Court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over this action, we affirm.   
I. 
 Hoffman is a citizen of New Jersey.  He is an attorney who has made a habit of 
filing class actions in which he serves as both the sole class representative and sole class 
counsel.  See, e.g., Hoffman v. DSE Healthcare Solutions, LLC, No. 13 Civ. 7582, 2014 
WL 1155472, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2014); Hoffman v. Lumina Health Prods., Inc., No. 
13 Civ. 4936, 2013 WL 5773292, at *2 (D.N.J., Dec. 17, 2013); Hoffman v. Natural 
Factors Nutritional Prods., No. 12 Civ. 7244, 2013 WL 5467106, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 
2013).  Nutraceutical Corporation is a Delaware corporation with its principle place of 
business in the State of Utah.     
 Hoffman filed this suit against Nutraceutical in the Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Bergen County.  The action concerns a Nutraceutical supplement, KAL® Glucosamine 
Chondroitin MSM, which purports to stem the progression of osteoarthritis and reduce 
related joint pain.  Hoffman, who bought a $20 bottle of the supplement, alleges that 
Nutraceutical falsely represented that the supplement was “of the highest quality,” when 
in fact the “product was polluted and contaminated by significant concentrations of lead.”  
App. 33.  Hoffman brought the suit “individually and [o]n behalf of others similarly 
situated pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 4:32,” with a “proposed Class consist[ing] of 
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all nationwide purchasers of KAL Glucosamine Chondroitin MSM for the six year period 
preceding the filing of this suit.”  App. 39.   
 The Complaint asserts violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 
56:8-2, as well as claims for common-law fraud, breach of contract, and common-law 
breach of warranty.  The Complaint demands the following damages: reimbursement of 
the sums paid by class members, treble damages and/or punitive damages, pre-judgment 
and post-judgment interest, fees, costs, and attorney’s fees.   
 Hoffman is the sole class representative of the putative class, although the 
Complaint acknowledges that Hoffman “may identify and propose additional class 
representatives with the filing of Plaintiff’s motion for class certification.”  App. 41.  
Hoffman is also counsel for the proposed class.  
 Shortly after Hoffman filed this action in state court, Nutraceutical removed the 
case to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, under the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”).  Hoffman moved to remand.  The Magistrate 
Judge recommended that the motion to remand be denied.  The District Court adopted the 
Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge in a Letter Order.  Subsequently,  
the District Court dismissed the case, first without prejudice, and then later with 
prejudice.  This appeal followed.
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2
 Because this action was dismissed on the merits, we have jurisdiction over the matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Albright v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 531 F.2d 132, 
134 (3d Cir. 1976) (“A denial of a motion to remand is properly reviewable on appeal 
from a final judgment.”).  “When a decision on subject-matter jurisdiction concerns pure 
questions of law or application of law to the facts, [a federal appellate court] conduct[] 
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II.
 
 
 Hoffman’s sole argument on appeal is that the District Court erred by failing to 
remand the case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Remand to state 
court is required “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”   28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).  The parties agree that if the 
District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this action, it would be pursuant to 
CAFA.  Thus, the fate of Hoffman’s appeal hinges upon whether the District Court had 
subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant that statute.   
 With certain exceptions not relevant here, CAFA grants federal courts original 
jurisdiction over actions in which: (1) the matter constitutes a “class action”; (2) “the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs”; (3) CAFA’s minimal diversity requirements are met; and (4) there are at least 100 
members of the putative class.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(5)(B).  Hoffman’s challenge 
to the District Court’s jurisdiction is premised entirely on the proposition that the amount 
in controversy of his suit cannot exceed $5 million. 
 Where, as here, the plaintiff does not specifically aver that the amount in 
controversy falls below CAFA’s $5 million threshold, the case must be remanded to state 
court if it is  “a legal certainty” that CAFA’s amount in controversy requirement cannot 
                                                                                                                                                  
a de novo review.”  Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 
2007) (en banc). 
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be met.  Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Hayes v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 353 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013) (declining to dismiss a class 
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where “the record on appeal is insufficient 
for us to determine that plaintiff cannot meet the $5,000,000 amount-in-controversy 
requirement to a legal certainty”).  Hoffman claims to have “carried his burden of 
evidencing to a legal certainty that he cannot recover the $5 million CAFA minimum.”  
Appellant’s Br. at 7.  His arguments is as follows: because Hoffman is both the sole class 
representative and the sole attorney for the class, the purported class cannot possibly be 
certified under established Third Circuit law.  See Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 
534 F.2d 1085, 1090 (3d Cir. 1976).  Thus, he reasons, the amount in controversy of the 
action—as least while the case remains in federal court—is tantamount to the value of 
Hoffman’s individual claim, roughly $200, rather than the aggregate value of the class 
members’ claims, which would easily exceed $5 million.  In other words, because it is a 
“legal certainty” that the class will not be certified, it follows that it is a “legal certainty” 
that the amount in controversy requirement cannot be met. 
 Hoffman’s argument is contravened by the plain language of CAFA, which 
mandates that federal courts calculate the amount in controversy of a putative class action 
before determining whether the class may be certified under Rule 23.  Specifically, 
CAFA instructs federal courts to determine whether the amount in controversy of a “class 
action” exceeds the $5 million threshold by “aggregat[ing]” “the claims of the individual 
class members.”  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6).  “Class action” is defined in the statute as “any 
civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State 
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statute or rule of judicial procedure.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).  And  
“class members” are “the persons (named or unnamed) who fall within the definition of 
the proposed or certified class in a class action.”  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(D) (emphasis 
added).  Hence, a putative class action satisfies CAFA’s amount in controversy 
requirement where (1) the action was filed under Rule 23 or a similar state statute or rule 
and (2) the aggregated claims of the proposed class members amount to more than $5 
million.  See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1348 (2013) (“[Section 
1332(d)(6)] tells the District Court to determine whether it has jurisdiction by adding up 
the value of the claim of each person who falls within the definition of [the] proposed 
class and determine whether the resulting sum exceeds $5 million.  If so, there is 
jurisdiction and the court may proceed with the case.”).  A putative class action’s 
prospects for certification are irrelevant to whether federal courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction over that action in the first instance.   Accord Newberg on Class Actions 
§ 6:18 (5th ed. 2013) (explaining that “the denial of class certification does not mean that 
the [federal] court never had subject matter jurisdiction” over the putative class action). 
 It is beyond dispute that this action was filed under a state statute “similar” in 
nature to Rule 23.  See Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 294 A.2d 7, 11 (N.J. 
1972) (explaining that New Jersey Rule 4:32 is a “replica” of Rule 23).  Moreover, 
Hoffman cannot demonstrate to a legal certainty that the claims of the purported class—
i.e., the “nationwide purchasers” of the supplement “for the six year period preceding the 
filing of this suit,” App. 39—are worth $5 million or less.  Accordingly, this action 
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satisfies CAFA’s amount in controversy requirement, and the District Court properly 
concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over Hoffman’s suit.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s denial of Hoffman’s 
motion to remand.  All costs will be taxed against the Appellant.   
